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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On the surface, technological advancements giving mothers-to-be the choice to 
have a C-section or schedule an induction without a medical reason2 and the 
continued legalization of Direct-Entry Midwifery appear to indicate that mothers are 
enjoying a greater amount of choice in selecting their method of childbirth.  But a 
closer examination reveals that, despite “the social and cultural movement directed 
toward affording pregnant, laboring, and birthing women greater autonomy and 
control during this vital reproductive process,”3 limits on maternal autonomy still 
exist.4 As more women deliver their children using Direct-Entry Midwives, through 
elective C-sections, or through scheduled induction, these limits have the potential to 
grow more intense. 
This perverse effect is the result of a flawed system,5 and changes can be made to 
protect maternal autonomy from the consequences of these flaws.6  Part II provides 
an overview of “new” delivery options available to pregnant women today.  Part III 
examines how courts, legislators, health care providers, birth advocates, and insurers 
                                                                 
2 This note will refer to C-sections requested and performed without a medical reason as 
“elective C-sections,” and induced labor scheduled without a medical reason as “scheduled 
induction.” 
3 Suzanne K. Ketler, The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A Cultural Analysis of the 
Informed Consent Doctrine After Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co Wisc., 95 NW. L. REV. 1029, 
1029 (2001). 
4 For a review of these limitations and some contemporary criticism of American 
maternity care, see generally  JENNIFER BLOCK, PUSHED : THE PAINFUL TRUTH ABOUT 
CHILDBIRTH AND MODERN MATERNITY CARE 1-24 (Da Capo Press 2007);  MARSDEN WAGNER, 
BORN IN THE U.S.A: HOW A BROKEN MATERNITY SYSTEM MUST BE FIXED TO PUT WOMEN AND 
CHILDREN FIRST 102 (University of California Press 2006). 
5 See WAGNER, supra note 4, at 4 (arguing that the fundamental flaw in American 
maternity care is that highly trained obstetricians are regularly attending normal and low risk 
pregnancies); BLOCK supra note 4 (highlighting several flaws in modern maternity care). 
6 This note builds on the suggestions and recommendations of many commentators. See 
WAGNER, supra note 4, 205-09 (advocating for increased accountability and transparency 
throughout pregnancy); Sylvia A. Law, Childbirth: An Opportunity for Choice That Should Be 
Supported, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. CHANGE 345, 362 (2008) (arguing that, where 
professional opinion is in conflict and women bring different birth values to the birth 
experience, the voices of women should be given greater weight); Ketler, supra note 4, at 
1055-56 (discussing informed consent); Margaret M. Donohoe, Our Epidemic of Unnecessary 
Cesarean Sections: The Role of the Law in Creating It, the Role of the Law in Stopping It, 11 
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 197, 201-02, 238-40 (1996)  (documenting the rise of unnecessary C-
sections and arguing that government agencies should provide women with accurate, 
physician-specific information on hospital and individual physician’s C-section usage). 
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limit a mother’s ability to choose what she believes to be the best delivery option.  
Part IV argues that as more women begin to have home births,7 elective C-sections, 
and scheduled inductions, the limits on maternal choice will grow more intense.  Part 
V suggests changes to combat these pressures and to protect a mother’s 
independence during labor.  This portion achieves its goal by offering a three-tiered 
approach to empower women to make well-informed delivery choices. This three-
tiered approach includes: (1) empowering the mother as a decision maker by 
providing her with more information and creating a system of disinterested health 
care provider education; (2) offering economic incentives to freestanding alternative 
birth centers and physicians, to make alternative services more appealing; and (3) 
reforming informed consent to facilitate greater dialogue between physician and 
patient.  
II.  “NEW” BIRTH OPTIONS  
In the past, legal restrictions, financial considerations, or circumstances 
surrounding maternal or fetal health have limited the delivery choices a mother could 
exercise.8  In recent years, however, progressive legislative efforts and changing 
medical standards have given American mothers a growing number of options when 
deciding how they will give birth.  While the number of women opting to exercise 
some of these options is small,9 it is possible that these methods will grow more 
popular.10  The following portion discusses several of these options.  
A.  Midwifery & Home Births 
1.  Midwifery—An Overview 
Midwifery is becoming an increasingly acceptable delivery option for American 
mothers.11  Throughout much of the industrialized world, the practice is recognized 
                                                                 
7 For a discussion of home births, see infra Part II. 
8 See infra Part III. 
9 Nearly 100 percent of all births in the United States in 2000 took place in a hospital.  
Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2000, 50 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. Feb. 2002, at 
14, 71. It is not certain how many mothers are actually opting to undergo an elective C-section 
without a medical reason.  Law, supra note 6, at 353-54. 
10 See infra notes 11, 34, & 76 and accompanying text. 
11 As of July 10, 2007, twenty five states allow Direct-Entry Midwives to practice after 
obtaining some licensure or certification, ten states and the District of Columbia prohibit the 
practice, four states do not prohibit or regulate them, in two states the practice is legal but 
licensure is unavailable, and nine states allow the practice by judicial or statutory 
interpretation.  Midwives Alliance of North America, Direct-Entry Midwifery State-By-State 
Legal Status, www.mana.org/statechart.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2009); see  also Christopher 
Rausch, The Midwives and the Forceps: The Wild Terrain of Midwifery Law in the United 
States and Where North Dakota is Heading in the Birthing Debate, 84 N. DAK. L. REV. 219, 
230-31 (2008); Bruce Hoffman, Minding the Gap: Legal Ideals and Strategic Action in State 
Legislative Hearings, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 89, 94-99 (2008).  Dr. Marsden Wagner Reports 
that in the past ten years, Midwife attended births have increased from five to nine percent. 
WAGNER, supra note 4 at 10.  
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as an essential part of effective maternity care.12  In most industrialized nations, 
midwives attend low-risk births, while trained obstetricians only attend dangerous 
deliveries, where their advanced knowledge and skill can be put to use. 13  Such a 
system does not exist in America today.14  The vast majority of deliveries in America 
today occur in hospitals under the supervision of trained obstetricians.15  
Midwives and physicians differ in their philosophical approach to pregnancy.16  
Unlike physicians, who typically have a “disease oriented approach” to treatment, 
midwives typically apply a “wellness approach.”17  The “disease-oriented approach” 
focuses on the diagnosis and treatment of pregnancy complications and the 
“management of diseases affecting pregnant women and the fetuses they carry.”18  
When applied, this “no case is normal until it’s over” philosophy may be 
contributing to the ever-increasing number of obstetrical interventions throughout 
pregnancy.19  Midwives, on the other hand, apply the more holistic and hands-off 
“wellness approach,” wherein a great deal of trust is placed into the body’s ability to 
bring about a safe delivery and medical intervention is avoided until absolutely 
necessary.20  Some have suggested that this approach is not financially attractive to 
hospitals because it results in longer deliveries that lessen the number of potential 
patients, and does not provide hospitals the opportunity to make a profit through 
administering billable procedures.21 
                                                                 
12 In Australia, the Netherlands, Great Britain, all Scandinavian countries, Germany, 
Ireland, and other industrialized nations more than seventy-five percent of all births are 
assisted by trained midwifes.  WAGNER, supra note 4, at 4.    
13 In most European nations, obstetricians attend between ten to fifteen percent of births. 
Id. at 5.  
14 Id. at 4-5.  
15 Nearly 100 percent of all births in the United States in 2000 took place in a hospital.  
Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2000, 50 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. Feb. 2002, at 
14, 71. Obstetricians attended nearly ninety percent of those births. WAGNER, supra note 4, at 
5. 
16 See generally Laura D. Hermer, Midwifery: Strategies on the Road to Universal 
Legalization, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 325, 329-35 (2003) (explaining the differences in health care 
provider treatment philosophies).    
17 Id.   
18 Id. at 329-30 (citing to JUDITH PENCE ROOKS, MIDWIFERY AND CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA 
4 (Temple University Press 1997)). 
19 Id. at 331.  
20 Id. at 332. 
21 BLOCK, supra note 4, at 66. At the same time, because midwives are paid less than 
physicians and the non-interventionist approach reduces the number of unnecessary medical 
interventions, the midwife model of care has been lauded as offering a significantly less 
expensive method of childbirth. WAGNER, supra note 4 at 39, 121; Rausch, supra note 11, at 
229. Some have asserted that the economic threat that out-of-hospital birth presents to the 
mainstream medical community is a factor contributing to restrictive midwifery laws. See 
Amy F. Cohen, The Midwifery Stalemate and Childbirth Choice: Recognizing Mothers-to-Be 
as the Best Late Pregnancy Decisionmakers, 80 IND. L. J. 849, 854 (2005).  
2010] PUSHING BACK:  PROTECTING MATERNAL AUTONOMY 49 
 
Regardless of their profit value, midwives have been providing birthing mothers 
with a valuable service for centuries.22  Midwife advocates boast that the practice is 
the oldest form of maternity care.23  But today’s midwives are much different from 
their old-world predecessors.24  Midwifery in America has evolved into a trade 
whose practitioners possess highly developed skills and training.25  As the practice 
has evolved, different midwifery classifications have developed.  
The two primary midwife classifications are Certified Nurse Midwives and 
Direct-Entry Midwives.26  Every American jurisdiction permits Certified Nurse 
Midwives to practice within its borders.27  Certified Nurse Midwives are formally 
educated nurses who acquire a nursing degree and then complete further study in 
Obstetrics and Gynecology before passing a certification examination.28  Typically, a 
Certified Nurse Midwife will practice in an institutional setting under a physician’s 
direct control.29  
Unlike their formally trained counterparts, Direct-Entry Midwives often take less 
traditional routes to practice.  Some Direct-Entry Midwives are educated through 
informal routes such as self-study or apprenticeship, rather than through a formal 
program.30  While many Direct-Entry Midwives can become certified through either 
the North American Registry of Midwives (NARM) or the American College of 
Nurse-Midwives (ACNM),31 “not all Direct-Entry Midwives are certified.”32  Some 
avoid certification because they view the training as harmful or irrelevant, while 
                                                                 
22 Women have been aiding each other throughout birth since the early civilizations. M. 
Brucker, A History of Midwifery, http://www3.utsouthwestern.edu/midwifery/mdwf 
history.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009); see also Rausch, supra note 11, at 224-25 (2008) 
(reviewing the history of midwives).  Females dominated the practice through the eighteenth 
century, until gynecology and surgery began to be studied by academics. Id. (citing to BRIAN 
E. BURTCH, TRIALS OF LABOUR: THE RE-EMERGENCE OF MIDWIFERY 80 (1994)). 
23 See generally Rausch, supra note 11, at 224.  
24 Id. at 224-227. 
25 See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. 
26 See generally Noralyn O. Harlow, Annotation, Midwifery: State Regulation, 59 A.L.R. 
4th 929, 932 (1988).    Direct-Entry Midwives are also referred to as “lay” midwives, for the 
sake of uniformity, this Note will only use the term “Direct-Entry Midwives.”  
27 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 102. 
28 Harlow, supra note 26.      
29 Id.  (citing to Debra Evenson, Midwives: Survival of an Ancient Profession, 7 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. REP. 313, 314 (1982)). 
30 See generally Harlow, supra note 26; Rausch, supra  note 11, at 223. 
31 NARM is an international certification agency created by the Midwives’ Alliance of 
North America (“MANA”) “to create [an] internationally accepted direct-entry midwifery 
credential to preserve the unique, woman-centered forms of practice that are common to 
midwives attending out-of-hospital births.” North American Registry of Midwives, NARM 
Mission Statement, http://www.narm.org/mission.htm (last visited Dec.  27 2008).  See 
generally Hermer, supra note 16, at 334 (discussing the NARM and ACNM certifications).  
32 Hermer, supra note 16 at 334.   
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others practice illegally in states that do not permit them to attend births. Finally, 
others simply lack the education, skills, or training needed to gain certification.33    
2.  A More Appealing Approach?  
Despite their lack of formal training, more women are utilizing Direct-Entry 
Midwives.34  In applying the more holistic “wellness approach,” Direct-Entry 
Midwives offer mothers in low-risk pregnancies a birthing option that removes the 
mother from the hospital and gives her a great deal of freedom during labor.35  
Unlike Certified Nurse Midwives, Direct-Entry Midwives typically attend home 
births.36  In a home birth, a laboring woman will usually deliver from her own house 
and will remain with her baby after the delivery.37  As Direct-Entry Midwifery 
becomes increasingly available, the number of women choosing home births appears 
to be increasing.38 
The freedom offered by home births lies in stark contrast to what may be 
experienced in a hospital setting.  In the hospital, once labor begins, mothers are 
often physically restricted to their hospital bed so that the fetal heart rate may be 
tracked using Electronic Fetal Monitors (EFMs).39  Despite little evidence supporting 
their efficacy, EFMs are the “presumptive standard of care”40  in the hospital.41  Two 
rationales support making EFMs the standard. First, EFMs are a more cost effective 
method for monitoring fetal heart rate,42 and second, they provide concrete evidence 
                                                                 
33 Id. Many illegally practicing midwives could only learn the trade through 
apprenticeships, because these midwives have been successfully delivering children without 
formal education, some see no reason to reason to further their education. Id.   
34 The midwife and home birth movement has grown increasingly popular in recent years.  
Julie Scelfo, Midwives Say Home Births Are Up, Despite Warnings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/garden/13birth.html?pagewanted= 
1&_r=2 (last visited Nov. 23, 2008) (documenting the increased number of women choosing 
home births in New York City).  Since 2007, a popular documentary and several books have 
been produced claiming to expose many problems with American maternity care and 
proposing that the solution for many women is to get out of the hospital and back into the 
home.  See, e.g., THE BUSINESS OF BEING BORN (New Line Home Video 2007); BLOCK, supra 
note 4, at 268. 
35 See infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text. In home births, mothers can set the 
environment according to their liking and freely move about without the fear of unnecessary 
medical intervention.  This is in stark contrast to being constrained to a bed and hooked to 
Electronic Fetal Monitors (EFMs), as is the presumptive standard of care in hospitals.   
36 Hermer, supra note 16, at 334; see also Rausch, supra note 11, at 223-25.  
37 Scelfo, supra note 34. 
38 Id.; Cf. BLOCK, supra note 4 at 268 (documenting the emerging birthing rights 
movement).   
39 Law, supra note 6, at 361-62  (explaining the use of EFMs). 
40 Id. at 362 (quoting H. David Banta & Stephen B. Thacker, Historical Controversy in 
Health Technology Assessment: The Case of Electronic Fetal Monitoring, 56 OBSTETRICAL & 
GYNECOLOGICAL SURV. 707, 714 (2001)).  
41 Id.  
42 Id. 
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should an accident occur.43  Home births are attractive, in part because they offer 
mothers the chance to deliver in the comfort of their own home, free from the 
restrictive EFMs, with little or no medication, and the freedom to move as they 
please.44   
Freedom is not the only reason that some opt to deliver via home births.45  For 
many, choosing to deliver away from the hospital is a choice that reflects spiritual, 
religious, political, and feminist beliefs.46  It is important to understand how firmly 
some mothers hold these beliefs.47 Trivializing this important point creates 
misunderstandings between lawmakers, physicians, and patients.48    
3.  Concerns Surrounding Home Births 
Despite the increased acceptance of home birth as a valid birth option, criticisms 
about its safety persist.49  Because midwives are not infallible and serious 
complications can turn low-risk pregnancies into high-risk deliveries with no 
warning,50 some suggest that the option needlessly risks the health and safety of both 
mother and child.51 Fetal injuries may occur because home births create distance 
between mothers, skilled obstetricians, and valuable hospital equipment.52  Others 
are concerned by Direct-Entry Midwives’ lack of formal education.53   
                                                                 
 
44 Scelfo, supra note 34. 
45 Cohen, supra note 21, at 858-62.  
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 See, e.g., id. at 854-62, 880 (arguing that midwifery advocates have not clearly 
communicated the numerous facets of their beliefs about childbirth to other parties). 
49 Whether or not these concerns are justified is unclear.   The data concerning the safety 
of delivering with a midwife suggests that for low-risk births, delivering with a midwife is a 
safe choice.  See generally BLOCK, supra note 4, at 95,264; WAGNER, supra note 4 at 35, 130; 
Hermer, supra note 16, at 339-48; Rausch, supra note 11, at 227-30.  
50 Joseph Heyman, Letter to Editor, L.A. TIMES July 23, 2008 available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/18830.html (last accessed Nov. 21, 2008). Dr. 
Heyman is Chairman of the Board of Trustees for the American Medical Association. See also 
Rausch, supra note 11, at 229-30. States have attempted to combat these dangers by requiring 
that Certified Nurse Midwives & Direct- Entry Midwives have written “supervisor” or 
“consultant” agreements with an obstetrician. WAGNER, supra note 4, at 132.    
51 Heyman, supra note 50.  
52 Cf. Ramsay v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 808 N.Y.S.2d 374 (2005) (granting defendant-
physician’s motion to dismiss because physician was not present at home delivery attended by 
midwife). 
53 See WAGNER, supra note 4, at 118-19 (documenting that at state legislative hearings 
considering legalizing Direct-Entry Midwifery, the common criticism lobbied against 
midwives was that delivering outside the hospital is “not safe.”).  
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Midwives often defend against health concerns by explaining that the option is 
only available to mothers in low-risk births.54  Studies have also demonstrated that 
the use of midwives is “just as safe, if not safer than medical care in low risk 
childbirth.”55  But at least some empirical evidence suggests that despite only taking 
on low-risk births, home births may be more dangerous than delivering in a 
hospital.56  This may be because no dependable method exists to predict if or when a 
low-risk pregnancy may turn dangerous.57   
4.  Questionable Support 
Even in states where Direct-Entry Midwifery is allowed, it is not always viewed 
favorably.  In 2007, Missouri added its name to the growing number of states 
legalizing Direct-Entry Midwifery.58  The bill legalizing the practice, House Bill 
818,59 passed in large part because of creative draftsmanship, and not because of 
genuine legislative support.60  House Bill 818,61 a 123 page bill dealing with health 
insurance, never once mentioned midwifery.62  Instead, Senator John Loudan buried 
language into the tail end of the bill permitting “any person who holds tocological 
certification … [to] provide services as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-
                                                                 
54 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 41; Rausch, supra note 11, at 229-30; Cohen, supra note 21, 
at 858-59. 
55 Hermer, supra note 16, at 326; see also Rausch, supra note 11, at 227-229 
(summarizing the statistical support for the safety of midwifery). 
56 Mr. Rausch discusses several of these studies.  See Rausch, supra note 11, at 229-30.  
Mr. Rausch highlighted that one study has shown that physicians are far more successful than 
midwives under certain circumstances.  See id. (citing to Lewis Mehl-Madrona & Morgaine 
Mehl-Madrona, Physician and Midwife-Attended Home Births: Effects of Breech, Twin and 
Post-Dates Outcome Data on Mortality Rates, 42 J. NURSE MIDWIFERY 91, 95 (1997)).  That 
study showed that the infant mortality rate is over three times higher in home births involving 
post-date, twin, or breech deliveries. Id.  Others have also reached the similar conclusions. See 
Amy Tuteur, New Wisconsin Statistics Continue to Show High Homebirth Death Rate, 
www.homebirthdebate.blogspot.com (citing to http://dhs.wisconsin.gov/wish/measures/inf_ 
mort/long_form.html) (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).  Dr. Tuteur examined statistics compiled by 
the state of Wisconsin and concluded that they suggest that the neonatal death rate for home 
births attended by lay midwives are nearly three times higher than those low risk births 
performed in hospitals.  
57Rausch, supra note 11, at 229. See also Scelfo, supra note 34 (quoting Dr. Erin Tracey).  
58MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1753 (LexisNexis 2008). 
59H.B. 818, 94th Gen. Assem., First Reg, Sess, (Mo. 2007).  
60The Missouri legislature had expressly refused to create a licensing board for Direct-
Entry midwives earlier in the 2007 legislative session. See S. 303, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. 
Sess. (Mo.  2007). See also  Matthew Franck, Midwives Bill Slips Through Missouri 
Legislature, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH  May 15, 2007, at A1, available at 
http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/special/srlinks.nsf/story/F661D676A70DF7CF862572
DC007A159E?OpenDocument. (last visited Dec. 2, 2008). 
61 Mo. H.B.818. 
62 Id. 
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6(b)(4)(E)(ii)(I).”63  The addition went unnoticed until shortly after the Missouri 
Congress passed the bill, at which point senators unsuccessfully attempted to nix the 
legislation before it was signed into effect.64  Following its enactment, Senator 
Loudan was briefly removed from his position as Chair of the Senate Small Business 
Committee65 and a lawsuit brought by several physicians’ associations was heard 
before the Missouri Supreme Court.66  
The frenzy surrounding Direct-Entry Midwives polarized many within 
Missouri.67  And while Direct-Entry Midwifery is now a legal practice,68 the battle 
fought over its legalization has contributed to the sometimes hostile relationship 
between doctors and midwives.69  As midwifery grows more popular, such 
relationships could diminish the quality of healthcare available to mothers.   
B.  Elective C-Sections 
Physicians have been performing C-sections in emergencies for some time.70 
While the procedure is major surgery,71  C-sections have become safe72 enough that 
                                                                 
63 Id. Sen. Loudan made certain that the meaning of this provision would not be easily 
determinable on first glance.  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6(b)(4)(E)(ii)(I) (2008) permits for an 
additional six month extension of emergency medical assistance for services related to 
pregnancy. And “tocological certification” is a derivative of the Greek term “tokos,” meaning 
childbirth. Franck, supra note 60.  “Tocology” is defined as the science of obstetrics and 
midwifery. Id.   
64 Franck, supra note 60. 
65 Id. 
66 Mo. State Med. Ass’n v. State, 256 S.W. 3d 85 (Mo. 2007) (reversing trial court 
judgment finding the statute constitutionally invalid because the plaintiffs lacked standing to 
bring suit). 
67 Franck, supra note 60.  
68 See, e.g., Mo. State Med Ass’n, 526 S.W.3d at 86.  
69 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 115. 
70Elena Conis, Cesarean Section’s Ancient History, LA Times, May 1 2006 at F-3, 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/may/01/health/he-esoterica1 (last visited Feb 12, 
2009).  Early Chinese drawings depict newborns being removed from openings in their 
mother’s abdomen and ancient Roman law required babies to be surgically removed when the 
mother died before or during labor.  Id.  The procedure was generally performed only where 
the mother had little chance for survival or was already dead until the late middle ages. Id. 
Women began surviving the procedure with some regularity in the 18th century.  Id.  It has 
since become a common procedure throughout the civilized world.  Id. Since the 1970’s, 
America’s high C-section rate has been the subject of much criticism. See generally BLOCK, 
supra note 4, at 109-13; Law, supra note 6 at 345-46.  In 2007 America’s C-section rate rose 
for the eleventh consecutive year, reaching an all time high of thirty-one and eight tenths 
percent.  See  Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Nat'l Vital Stats. Reports, Births: 
Preliminary Data for 2007, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/ 
nvsr57_12.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).  International studies show that when the C-section 
rate is between ten and fifteen percent, the maternal mortality rate decreases. WAGNER, supra 
note 4, at 42, 47-48 (citing to and explaining the methodology leading to the World Health 
Organization’s conclusion and consistent recommendations that a ten to fifteen percent C-
section rate is the optimal rate for maternal and fetal health).  
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physicians may give mothers the option to request that their child be delivered using 
this method without a medical reason.73  There is a professional consensus that, at a 
woman's request, it is medically acceptable and sometimes ethically responsible to 
perform C-sections without a medical reason.74 Although the number of women 
requesting elective C-sections is small,75 it is possible that more women will opt to 
deliver in this fashion.76  
                                                          
71A physician performs a cesarean delivery by making an incision in the abdominal wall 
and uterus (rather than through the vagina) the amniotic fluid is suctioned out and then the 
baby is delivered. American Pregnancy Association, Cesarean Procedure, 
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/labornbirth/cesareanprocedure.html (last visited Nov. 21, 
2008). The normal cesarean procedure will take an average of forty-five minutes to an hour. 
The baby is usually delivered in the first five to fifteen minutes and the remainder of time is 
used for closing the incision. Id.  This is much quicker than the typical vaginal delivery. 
WAGNER, supra note 4, at 38-44.   
72 The dangers presented by C-sections are well documented. See WAGNER, supra note 4 
at 44-45. Dr. Wagner posits that women who choose C-sections do not appreciate the risk they 
are taking. Id. Despite the risks, Professor Law argues that elective C-sections are a justifiable 
choice for women to make. Law, supra note 6 at 346.  
73This position has garnered more acceptance in the past decade. In 2003, The American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”) stated that it was sometimes medically 
and ethically responsible for a physician to perform a C-section without a medical reason, and 
in 2006, the National Institute of Health (“NIH”) recognized that in some circumstances that 
elective C-section might be a reasonable alternative to planned vaginal delivery.  See generally 
BLOCK, supra note 4 at 56; Law, supra note 6, at 347, 353.  Professor Law offers a thorough 
discussion of the motives and rationales of those who choose to exercise this option.  See id. at 
347-54 (discussing the motivations and effects underlying the choice to undergo an elective C-
section).  
74 Law, supra note 6 at 353.  Professor Law supports this position by explaining that the 
ACOG, the New England Journal of Medicine, and the National Institutes of Health have each 
reached this conclusion. Id. (citing to American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 
Surgery and Patient Choice, Op. No. 289 11 (2003); Howard Minkoff & Frank Chervenak, 
Elective Primary Cesarean Delivery, 348 NEW ENG. J. Med. 946 (2003); Nat’l Insts. of 
Health, State-of-the-Science Conference Statement, Cesarean Delivery on Maternal Request, 
March 27-29, at 14).  Professor Law further notes that surveys show that practicing physicians 
have a wide range of attitudes towards performing C-sections without a medical reason. Id. at 
353. 
75 See Law, supra note 6, at 353 (citing to Childbirth Connection’s “Listening to Mothers” 
survey documenting that only one out of one thousand three hundred women reported 
requesting a C-section). 
76 Evidence suggests that the number of women opting to have a C-section without a 
medical reason may be increasing. See BLOCK, supra note 4 at 52 (documenting that, in at 
least one hospital, physicians reported that one out of every approximately sixty women are 
making unprompted requests for elective C-sections); see, e.g., Barbara Bettes, et al, Cesarean 
Delivery on Maternal Request, 109 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 57, 58, 61  (2007)  (internal 
citations omitted) (documenting that more than half of American physicians have either 
performed a C-section on maternal request or would be willing to do so and in 2006 58% of 
obstetricians observed an increase in inquiries regarding elective C-section).  
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C.  Induced Labor 
American women may also elect to have their labor induced through physician-
administered drugs prior to the child initiating the labor process.77  Labor is induced 
using intravenous medication, usually Oxytocin78(or its synthetic form, Pitocin79), 
that brings on contractions in the uterus.80  Other methods for inducing labor include 
rupturing the amniotic sac (breaking the water) or dilating the cervix.81  Today, 
approximately fifteen percent of babies born in America are delivered via induced 
labor.82  Although this practice is nothing new, the frequency with which physicians 
rely upon these medications is often criticized, and is an impetus behind the reaction 
against “medicalized” birth that is causing some mothers to deliver outside the 
hospital.83    
III.  LIMITING MATERNAL AUTONOMY  
To understand why exercising these options with greater frequency will lead to 
diminished maternal choice, it is first important to examine several problems with 
maternity care in America.  A flaw in this “broken”84 system is the multitude of ways 
                                                                 
77American Pregnancy Association, Inducing Labor, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/ 
labornbirth/inducinglabor.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); see also American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Labor Induction, http://www.acog.org/publications/patient_ 
education/bp154.cfm (last visited October 19, 2008).  
78Oxytocin is a hormone produced by the hypothalamus that is stored in and released from 
the pituitary gland. 1 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1 (citing to STEPHEN GABBE ET AL., 
OBSTETRICS: NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 363 (1986)).    
791 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1. 
801 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1. 
81American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 77. 
82Id. 
83 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 78, 85, 130, 190; BLOCK, supra note 4, at 14, 41, 268; Cohen, 
supra note 21, at 858. This Note posits that the reaction against medicalized birth will 
contribute to more combative delivery behavior that may have adverse consequences in some 
situations.  
84 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 1-12.  Wagner and others are calling America’s maternity care 
system “broken” for numerous reasons.  Commentators cite to the over-medicalization of 
maternity care as a primary problem, as well as the illegality of Direct-Entry Midwifery and 
the difficulty many mothers experience when they wish to attempt to deliver vaginally after a 
C-section (VBAC). BLOCK, supra note 4, at 17-31, 77 (discussing the “active management of 
labor” and VBAC); WAGNER, supra note 4, at 39-40 (explaining that physicians are trained to 
find problems in dangerous situations and suggesting that the result is that too many women 
are receiving unnecessary treatment); Cohen, supra note 21, at 850 (documenting that many 
women believe midwifery to be a viable, but unavailable option); Donohoe, supra note 6 at 
241 (explaining that the root of the unnecessary C-section problem is the physicians “need to 
‘do’”). The recent trend towards home births is, in part, a reaction against the over-
medicalization of birth pervading American maternity care today. See supra note 83.   
Statistics concerning maternal and fetal mortality rates are often cited to bolster these 
criticisms. As of 2005, twenty-eight countries have lower maternal mortality rates and forty-
one nations have lower infant mortality rates than the United States. World Health 
Organization, http://www.who.int/reproductive-health/publications/maternal_mortality_2005/ 
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that maternal choice is limited by the government, health care providers, advocacy 
groups, and insurance companies.85  The following portion will examine several 
factors contributing to this broken system.  
A.  Legal Basis for Maternal Choice 
Before discussing how maternal autonomy is being limited, it is first important to 
review what rights the law proscribes to pregnant women when determining how 
they will deliver their child.  This section will discuss how physicians may coerce 
patients into undergoing certain medical procedures in an effort to protect fetal 
health.  Generally, such coercion may infringe upon a woman’s right to refuse 
medical treatment or to be free from unwanted medical intrusion.86  
This section will also discuss how the government has implemented laws 
restricting midwifery and freestanding alternative birth centers.  Several 
commentators have suggested that a mother’s right to choose alternative modes of 
childbirth is constitutionally protected.87  Although the Supreme Court has not yet 
found that such a right exists, Amy F. Cohen identifies several arguments to support 
the contention that a mother’s right to make alternative birth choices, like home birth 
with a Direct-Entry Midwife, is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.88  First, because personal autonomy is at the root of the privacy right,89 
and childbirth decisions are intensely personal decisions90 that present “social, 
economic, and political, rather than merely medical issues,”91 the maternal right to 
choose different birth methods is strongly supported by the right to privacy.92  
                                                          
mme_2005.pdf (last accessed Dec. 1 2008); Central Intelligence Agency, The World 
Factbook, Infant Mortality Rate, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/2091.html (last accessed Dec. 1 2008).   
85 See, e.g., BLOCK, supra note 4 at 261. 
86 See generally Pamala Harris, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: The 
Balancing of Maternal and Fetal Rights, 49 CLEV. ST. L. R. 133, 139-40 (2001) (“A competent 
pregnant woman may, for many reasons, refuse medical treatment that a physician regards as 
beneficial to the woman, the fetus, or in some instances, both.”).  
87 In advocating for a woman’s right to select midwifery, Amy Cohen condensed these 
arguments into one place. See Cohen, supra note 21; see also Charles Wolfson, Midwives and 
Home Birth: Social, Medical and Legal Perspectives, 37 Hastings L.J. 909, 935 (1986); Harry 
M. Caldwell, Bowland v. Municipal Court Revisited: A Defense Perspective on Unlicensed 
Midwife Practice in California, 15 PAC L.J. 19, 29-30 (1983); Dale Elizabeth Walker,  
Comment, A Matter of Quality of Births: Mothers and Midwives Shackled by the Medical 
Establishment and Pennsylvania Law, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 171, 192-94 (1984); Barbara A. 
McCormick, Childbearing and Nurse-Midwives: A Woman’s Right to Choose, 58 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 661; 682-97 (1983).  
88 Cohen, supra note 21, at 869-875. 
89 Id. at 870.  
90 McCormick, supra note 87, at 686 (explaining further that denial of the right would 
impose psychological, physical, social, and financial burdens upon the woman). 
91 Wolfson, supra note 87, at 941-42. 
92 Cohen, supra note 21, at 869. 
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Second, the possibility of surgical invasion implicates the right to bodily integrity.93  
Because bodily integrity is “the mainstay of any … privacy argument,” Ms. Cohen 
suggests this further supports maternal choice being a fundamental right.94  Finally, a 
woman’s parental authority to make decisions for the upbringing of her family also 
supports the conclusion that a woman has a fundamental right to choose alternative 
delivery methods.95   
As compelling as these arguments may be, whether the Court would recognize 
that such a right exists is not clear.  The Court's reluctance to recognize "new" 
fundamental rights may make establishing such a right unlikely.96  Ms. Cohen 
viewed the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, with its affirmation of 
the “expansive language on substantive due process, liberty, and the sweet mystery 
of life”97 quoted in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, as a harbinger that the Court may 
expand substantive due process to recognize the right to make alternative birth 
decisions (midwifery) as a fundamental right.98    
Since Ms. Cohen’s article, Gonzales v. Carhart has further illuminated the 
Court’s view on substantive due process.99  Carhart is “the most definitive statement 
to date from the Roberts Court of its approach to substantive due process 
methodology.”100 Northwestern University’s Professor Steven Calabresi reads 
Carhart as marking “a pointed retreat from Lawrence.”101  Professor Calabresi 
argues that Carhart demonstrates that “[Justice Kennedy] and four other Justices 
have recommitted themselves to the narrow, restrained approach of Glucksberg in 
substantive due process cases."102  This affirmation of a “cautious, pro-judicial 
restraint approach suggests a greatly reduced role for the Court in inventing new 
constitutional rights that is dramatically opposed to the expansive language of Casey 
and Lawrence.”103  Consequently, it may be unlikely that the Court will find that 
such a right does exist.   
Whether or not the Court will conclude that the right to make alternative 
childbirth decisions is fundamental is a valuable consideration.  Should the Court 
                                                                 
93 McCormack, supra note 87, at 691.   
94 Id. 
95 Cohen supra note 21, at 872. 
96 Id. 
97 Stephen Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 1517 (2008). 
98 Cohen, supra note 21.   
99 550 U.S. 124 (2007).   
100 Calbresi, supra note 97, at 1520. 
101 David D. Meyer, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Hazards of Muddled Scrutiny, 17 J. L. 
POL’Y 57, 60 (2008).   
102 Calabresi, supra note 97, at 1517.  In so reaching this conclusion, Professor Calabresi 
also points out that the Court never once cites Lawrence or the expansive language on 
substantive due process, liberty, and the sweet mystery of life that the Lawrence opinion 
quoted from Casey. Id.  
103 Id. at 1520.   
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revert to the broad Casey conception of fundamental rights, as it did in Lawrence, 
then some of the restrictions discussed below may be in violation of this right.  
Moreover, recognizing that such a right exists could reduce physician paternalism 
that has been identified as causing unnecessary C-sections104 and pushing some 
women to deliver outside the hospital setting.105      
B.  Other Legal Interests Affecting Maternal Choice 
To comprehend fully why maternal choice is limited, it is necessary to examine 
briefly the legal interests that the government and health care providers have in a 
mother’s delivery decision.  Physicians owe a duty of care to both the mother and her 
fetus,106 and the state has a compelling interest in fetal health.107  Sometimes, a 
mother’s refusal to receive medical treatment conflicts with these interests.108  When 
a physician believes the mother’s birth decision places fetal health at risk, doctors are 
faced with an ethical dilemma.109  The physician can either honor the woman’s 
refusal or “compel her to treatment by seeking a court order.”110 The consensus 
among medical professionals is that such actions are almost never appropriate.111 
And while courts have held that the decision of whether or not to undergo medical 
treatment is one that must be honored, others have determined that the mother’s right 
to refuse medical treatment is not absolute, and must be balanced against the state or 
fetal interests.112  In some unusual circumstances, courts have compelled women to 
submit to medical intervention.113 Although interventions are rare, this Note posits 
                                                                 
104 Donohoe, supra note 6, at 235-36 (suggesting that doctors interpret the legal treatment 
of maternal and fetal rights as being in competition with one another, and, as a consequence 
receive a message that paternalism towards their patients is acceptable). If a mother’s right to 
make childbirth choices is given greater recognition, physician paternalism would conceivably 
be diminished, as physicians would receive a message that the mother’s right to choose is 
afforded greater legal significance that should not be subordinated to protect the fetus.  
105 Cohen, supra note 21, at 858.  
106 See Harris, supra note 86, at 140-43.  
107 Id.  
108 Id.  See infra notes 151-176 and accompanying text.  
109 Harris, supra note 86, at 140-43.  
110 Id. at 134.   
111 See Linda C. Fentiman, The New “Fetal Protection”: The Wrong Answer to the Crisis 
of Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 537, 569-70 (2006) 
(noting that the American Medical Association, the American College of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, and the American Academy of Pediatrics each have adopted strong positions 
against compelled medical treatment). 
112 See John Alan Cohan, Judicial Enforcement of Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling 
Patients, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 849, 896-911 (2006) (documenting cases involving pregnant 
women refusing medical treatment).  
113See generally Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 
1981); Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp.2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 
1999). See also April Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant 
Women for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 147 (2007) (discussing the 
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that as home births, and more generally the reaction against medicalized birth of 
which they are an outgrowth, become more popular, more women will refuse to 
consent to procedures during hospital deliveries. As more mothers do not consent to 
what physicians believe to be the appropriate delivery method, the delivery room 
will become a hostile environment. When conflicts arise in such a hostile 
environment, courts may be called upon to force mothers to submit to medical 
treatment.  In light of the chaotic circumstances surrounding such deliveries,114 and 
the government’s propensity to protect the fetus from harm,115 this Note posits that 
an increase in court-compelled medical treatment may result.  
C.  Governmental Limitations 
1.  Generally 
As pregnancy progresses, the number of government limitations on a mother’s 
birth options increase. Every state has the power to regulate the midwives who 
practice within its borders.116  Depending upon the state, the government may also 
restrict choice by limiting where a woman may choose to deliver her child, or by 
failing to require that certain information be made available for mothers to make 
birth decisions.  The following portion discusses these restrictions before shifting its 
focus to explore ways that the government limits maternal autonomy to protect fetal 
health. 
2.  Birth Centers  
Birth centers offer women a delivery choice other than hospitals or the home.  
Generally, these centers can either be “freestanding” or run in conjunction with a 
hospital.117  Freestanding alternative birth centers are establishments run by 
midwives with permanent facilities that operate independent of any hospital 
affiliation,118  and provide prenatal care only to low-risk child bearing women.119  
Freestanding alternative birth centers are not available everywhere.120  Presently state 
                                                          
judiciary’s use of incarceration, detention, and threats to compel pregnant women to submit to 
physician decisions regarding medical treatment for the benefit of fetal health); Fentiman, 
supra note 111, at 569 (documenting a 2004 court ordered C-section  that was never carried 
out because the mother, after refusing to consent to a C-section, successfully delivered 
vaginally at another hospital). 
114 “[P]roceedings in court-ordered cesareans are usually procedurally inadequate,” Cohen, 
supra note 21, at 866-67 n.75. 
115 See infra Part III.C.4 
116See generally Hermer, supra note 16 (discussing midwifery law in America); Stacy A. 
Tovino, American Midwifery Litigation and State Legislative Preferences for Physician 
Controlled Childbirth, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 68-69 (2004) (discussing current legal 
status of midwifery in America). 
117 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 137.  
118 Id. at 133; See also 902 KY. ADMIN. R.  20:150 (2008). 
119 902 KY. ADMIN. R.  20:150 (2008).  
120 See, e.g., BLOCK, supra note 4 at 106, 267.  
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regulations specifically governing how birth centers can operate may limit birth 
center location121 or the number of centers permissible in one geographic region.122  
Despite these restrictions, as of 2006, 160 freestanding alternative birth centers 
existed in the United States.123  But a number of these centers are struggling to stay 
open, in part because compliance with additional statutory requirements124 and high 
insurance premiums make operating for profit difficult.125  
To accommodate maternal demand for a less sterile and more homely 
atmosphere, some hospitals have also begun to offer their own birth centers.126  
Unfortunately, these options are subject to many of the same criticisms as 
hospitals.127  Hospitals have also tried to accommodate for these demands by offering 
home-like birth suites.128  Even if a mother wishes to deliver in a birth suite, she may 
not be able to do so because delivering in one can be costly129 and reserving a suite 
does not guarantee that delivery will take place within.130 
                                                                 
121 CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1204.3 (Deering 2009) (requiring alternative birth 
centers to be located within 30 minutes in both time and distance from a facility with the 
capacity to manage obstetrical and neonatal emergencies). 
122 210  ILL. COMP. STAT. 3/30(a-25) (2009) (requiring that “[t]here shall be no more than 
10 birth center alternative care models . . . .”). That section further limits the number of birth 
centers located throughout the state according to population. Id. 
123 WAGNER, supra note 5, at 137. 
124 Id. at 132 (discussing the “supervisor” and “consultant” relationships that some states 
require midwives to be engaged in with a practicing physician in order to practice legally); 
see, e.g. Kelly Dunleavy, Sacramento’s Alternative Birth Options Dwindle, Sacramento 
Business Journal, October 5, 2007, available at http://sacramento.bizjournals.com/sacramento 
/stories /2007/10/08/focus2.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009) (documenting the closing of a 
Sacramento birth center, which is required by law to have “supervising” agreements between 
doctors and midwives, and noting that no area physicians were willing to work with the closed 
birth center).    
125 See, e.g., Dunleavy, supra note 124; Katherine Shaver, Birth Centers’ Closures Limit 
Delivery Options, The WASHINGTON POST, May 18, 2007, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/17/AR2007051702301.html 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2009)  (documenting “rising malpractice insurance premiums and 
lagging insurance premiums” as a cause of birth center closures in the Washington-Baltimore 
area). 
126 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 133. 
127 Id. Unlike in freestanding alternative birth centers, “where the mother has the final say 
about everything that happens to her,” hospital birth centers are staffed by obstetricians whose 
disease oriented approach makes medication and intervention just as likely as in a normal 
hospital. Id. 
128 See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., Dept of Obstetrics and Gynecology,  A “Suite” 
Experience, www.cedars-siani.edu/1799.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
129 As of Dec. 1, 2008, a birth suite at Cedars Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles costs 
from $1,869 to $2,646 per day.  Id.  
130 Id. 
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3.  Maternal Information Statutes 
Commentators consistently argue that empowering women is the best way to 
solve many maternity care problems.131  Despite this consensus, only two states are 
attempting to give mothers the appropriate information to make their delivery 
decisions by requiring that hospitals make their C-section and induction rates 
available to potential patients.132  New York requires that every hospital and birth 
center prepare and distribute to every prospective maternity patient, upon request, an 
informational leaflet explaining the treatments available.133  Included in that 
pamphlet must be the annual C-section rates performed at the facility.134  In contrast 
to the more specific requirements in New York, many states simply require that 
hospitals keep some records of all C-sections performed, and that these records be 
submitted to an appropriate agency.135  By failing to require that specific information 
be made available to mothers, governments are inhibiting a mother’s ability to make 
the best possible decision for herself and her child.136  
4.  Protecting the Fetus 
Much has been written about the continued expansion and recognition of fetal 
rights by American courts and legislatures.137  Before the landmark case Roe v. 
                                                                 
131 Donohoe, supra note 6 at 237-40; WAGNER, supra note 4, at 11, 205-208; see,, e.g. 
Law, supra note 6, at 362 (arguing that mother’s opinions ought to be given greater weight in 
the labor process).  
132 BLOCK, supra, note 4 at 270; Donohoe, supra note 6 at 237; Transcript, What to 
Expect: Legal Developments and Challenges in Reproductive Justice, 15 CARDOZO J. L. 
GENDER 503, 513 (2009).  It appears that states are making more information available to the 
public through the internet. See http://thebirthsurvey.com/dev/Results/learn_state.shtml (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2009) (compiling the information available for all 50 states and providing 
links to individual state websites). A review of state websites shows that C-section and 
intervention rates may be organized by county, mother’s age, race, or sometimes hospital.  Id. 
As helpful as this information may be, the information some hospitals may provide could be 
inaccurate or outdated. WAGNER, supra note 4, at 11, 206; see, e.g., Betsy Gotbaum, A 
Mother’s Right to Know, New York City Hospitals Fail to Provide Legally Mandated 
Maternity Information, (July 2005), available at 
http://pubadvocate.nyc.gov/policy/documents/AMothersRightto Know.pdf.   
133 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2803-j (2008). 
134 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2803-j (2008). 
135 See, e.g,, WAGNER, supra note 4, at 24; see O.C.G.A. § 31-7-280(c)(13)(C) (2009) 
(requiring that all hospitals operating in the state keep records of the C-section rate by number 
and as a percentage of deliveries, and submit those records annually to the Department of 
Community Health). 
136 Donohoe, supra note 6 at 237-39; Wagner, supra note 4 at 205-206. 
137 See generally Harris, supra note 86, at 139-40  (examining expanding fetal rights);  
Amy Lotierzo, Comment, The Unborn Child, A Forgotten Interest: Reexamining Roe in Light 
of Increased Recognition of Fetal Rights, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 279 (2006) (discussing expanding 
fetal rights in federal legislation, family law, tort law, property law, and family law). 
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Wade,138 “[i]n areas other than criminal abortion, the law [was] reluctant to endorse 
any theory that life . . . begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn 
except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon 
live birth.”139  Operating off this understanding of the law’s treatment of fetal rights, 
the Roe Court reasoned that the unborn acquired legal rights only at birth.140  In 
accordance with this rationale, Roe limited the state’s interest in protecting the rights 
of the unborn.141  
Since Roe, “there has been an increasing recognition and expansion of the rights 
of unborn children in various areas of the law.”142  Probably the broadest protections 
afforded to the fetus are given by state legislatures adopting laws declaring that a 
fetus is a person from the time of fertilization and implantation.143  These laws give 
courts the opportunity to protect the fetus or those who have a stake in its health 
through tort, family, and property law.144  Other state protectionist laws aim to 
protect the fetus from criminal harms inflicted by others.145  The federal government 
has also taken an active role in protecting the fetus from criminal harms.146  
                                                                 
138 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that unborn children are not legal persons 
entitled to the protections of the Constitution).  
139 Id. at 161.  
140 Id. 
141 However, as others have pointed out, when the Court ruled in Roe, the shift to laws 
further recognizing the rights of the unborn had already begun. See Bradley Aron Cooper, 
Essay, The Definition of “Person:” Applying the Casey Decision to Roe v. Wade, 19 Regent 
U. L. Rev. 235, 241 (2006). In supporting this assertion, Mr. Cooper notes that the Roe Court 
acknowledged that some states had already begun to pass wrongful death statutes permitting 
parents to bring suit where prenatal injuries caused still births. Id.; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 
162. A fetus is viable when it is capable of living outside the womb. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
142 Lotierzo, supra note 137, at 279. 
143 See generally 720 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:2(7) (2008) 
(defining “person” as human beings from the moment of fertilization and implantation); MISS 
CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (2006); MO. REV. STAT. §1.205 (2008) (declaring that the life of each 
human begins at conception); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-809 (2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN 
§1.07(a)(26) (2006). Others have suggested that there is no way to equalize the rights of the 
fetus and the woman without undermining a woman’s liberty interests. See generally  Lisa 
McLennan Brown, Symposium: The Feminism and Legal Theory Project: Celebrating Twenty 
Years of Feminist Pedagogy, Praxis and Prisms: Feminist Theory and the Erosion of Women’s 
Reproductive Rights: The Implications of Fetal Personhood Laws and In Vitro Fertilization, 
13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 87, 91 (2007).  
144 See Lotierzo, supra note 137, at 279-81. These protections are not just limited to 
mothers, as male interests in fetal health are also recognized. See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E. 2d 
522 (W. Va. 1995) (permitting bereaved father to bring a cause of action under West 
Virginia’s wrongful death statute for the death of his wife and her nonviable fetus).   
145 Currently, thirty-five states have passed legislation recognizing that, in some 
circumstances, the unlawful killing of an unborn child is a homicide. See National Right to 
Life Committee, State Unborn Victim Laws, available at http://www.nrlc.org 
/Unborn_Victims/Statehomicidelaws092302.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).  It merits 
mentioning that New York’s statutes are conflicting. Under New York statutory law, the 
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More unsettling than the above protections are those policies that aim to protect 
the fetus from harms that have not yet occurred.147  Under the auspices of enforcing 
the state’s interest in protecting fetal health, courts have forced mothers to undergo 
C-sections148 and have used “incarceration, detention, orders of hospital confinement, 
and threats thereof, to compel pregnant women to access prenatal care and to submit 
to their physicians' directions regarding medical treatment for the benefit of fetal 
health.”149  Judges have also used such threats to "encourage" the mother to bring her 
fetus to term.150  
i.  Compelled Medical Treatment 
The right to refuse medical treatment is not absolute,151 and where a mother 
refuses to undergo medical treatment, some courts have performed a balancing test to 
decide whether a compelling state interest exists to override the competent mother's 
refusal of medical treatment.152  Where the judge has determined that the state’s 
interests outweigh the mother’s right of bodily autonomy, a court will subvert 
maternal rights to protect the fetus.153  Although only a few forced medication cases 
have ever occurred, it is plausible that changes in how women are perceiving birth 
                                                          
killing of an "unborn child" after twenty-four weeks of pregnancy is homicide. N.Y. Pen. Law 
§ 125.00  (McKinney 1998). But under a separate statutory provision, a "person" that is the 
victim of a homicide is statutorily defined as a "human being who has been born and is alive." 
N.Y. Pen. Law § 125.05 (McKinney 1998).  See People v. Joseph, 130 Misc. 2d 377, 496 
N.Y.S.2d 328 (County Court 1985); In re Gloria C., 124 Misc.2d 313, 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984); People v. Vercelletto, 514 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Co. Ct. 1987). 
146 See Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 U.S.C.S. §1841 (LexisNexis 2008) (protecting 
the unborn fetus by punishing those who cause criminal injury to a child in utero).  
147 Cf.  Cherry, supra note 113. 
148 See In Re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987) (forcing terminally ill cancer patient to 
undergo C-section); Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457 (affirming lower court order compelling a 
woman to submit to C-section and other procedures allegedly necessary to save the fetus’s 
life); Pemberton, 66 F. Supp.2d at 1247 (discussed below). 
149 Cherry, supra note 113, at 148. 
150 Id.  
151 Cruzan v, Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280- 82 (1990).  
152 See Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At The Intersection Of The 
Ideology Of Motherhood, The Practice Of Defaulting to Science, And The Interventionist 
Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205 1252-53 (1992) (discussing the balancing test used in 
compelled medical treatment cases). 
153 The likelihood that such a petition will be granted is unclear. Numerous commentators 
have argued that such court orders are unacceptable. See generally Harris, supra note 86, at 
161; Cohan, supra note 112. at 896 n.213 (highlighting multiple law review articles that 
discuss the maternal fetal rights debate); but see Daniel R. Leavy, The Maternal-Fetal 
Conflict: The Right of a Woman to Refuse A Cesarean Section Versus The State’s Interest In 
Saving The Life of The Fetus, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (2005) (arguing that a state should 
be able to require a woman to under to undergo a C-section based on a duty to rescue due to 
the special relationship formed between the mother and fetus by the time of viability).  
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(most dramatically represented by the home birth movement), will give rise to more 
situations where the judiciary will be called upon to resolve delivery decisions.154  
In Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l. Reg. Med. Ctr., Inc, Florida’s Second 
Judicial Circuit granted permission to Tallahassee Memorial Medical Center to 
forcibly perform a C-section on Laura Pemberton because attempting vaginal 
delivery constituted too great a risk to fetal health, given her physical condition.155  
The scar from Ms. Pemberton’s previous C-section posed such a threat to her unborn 
child’s life that no doctor or midwife would attend a vaginal delivery.156  Yet, Ms. 
Pemberton remained convinced that vaginal delivery was the safest way to deliver 
her child.157  Ms. Pemberton ignored all medical advice and ordered medical supplies 
so that she and her husband could deliver their child alone.158  After laboring for two 
days, Ms. Pemberton checked into Tallahassee Memorial requesting IV fluids.159  
While at Tallahassee Memorial, three separate physicians determined that a cesarean 
was medically necessary.160  Rather than undergoing a C-section, Ms. Pemberton fled 
Tallahassee Memorial.161  That decision resulted in police forcibly returning Ms. 
Pemberton to Tallahassee Memorial, where doctors proceeded to forcibly execute a 
C-section after determining that the state’s interest in delivering a healthy baby 
superseded Ms. Pemberton’s interest in refusing a C-section.162  
Ms. Pemberton’s case is often cited as an example of the government 
overstepping its bounds and hospitals refusing to let birth proceed naturally.163  But 
in light of the government’s propensity to protect the fetus from harm, it also 
provides a warning sign to mothers participating in home births.  Like Ms. 
Pemberton, many mothers that decide to forego hospital births have done so based 
on strong personal beliefs about childbirth.164 As the home birth movement and the 
reaction against medicalized birth grow in popularity, mothers will continue place 
greater faith in their body’s natural ability to deliver safely.   As anti-intervention 
convictions grow stronger, more circumstances may arise where doctor and patient 
                                                                 
154 See infra part IV; Cf. Leavy, supra note 153. 
155 Pemberton, 66 F. Supp.2d at 1256.   
156 Ms. Pemberton’s scar “extended well beyond the traditional low vertical incision up 
into the thickened myometrium.” Id. at 1249. Initially, a physician did support a vaginal birth, 
but the physician withdrew his support when Ms. Pemberton was twenty-five weeks pregnant.  
BLOCK, supra note 4, at 249. The court’s opinion differs from Block’s account in that it does 
mention that a midwife was attending during the labor. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp.2d at 1249. 
157 BLOCK, supra note 4, at 249. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. 
160 Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1249. All tests, indicated that the fetus was healthy and 
birth was progressing safely, albeit slowly. BLOCK, supra note 4, at 251.   
161 BLOCK, supra note 4, at 250. 
162 Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1248. 
163 BLOCK, supra note 4, at 250. 
164 See Cohen, supra note 21, at 855-57.   
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strongly disagree about the appropriate delivery method. More disagreements could 
lead to court compelled medical treatment.165   
ii.  Detention, Incarceration, and Child Abuse  
Courts may also take a mother into custody to protect the fetus from potential 
harm.  Professor Cherry explains that some courts may use their parens patriae166 
power to take mothers into custody and “compel state-sanctioned maternal behavior 
deemed necessary for the health or life of fetuses.”167  Some courts have relied on 
provisions in state child welfare laws to support taking custody of the fetus.168  
Others have taken an aggressive role in fetal protection where there exists a high 
potential that fetal harms will arise from poor maternal choices.169  This is especially 
true where a woman’s criminal actions have put fetal health at risk.170  Implicit in 
these policies is a belief that alcohol or drug dependent mothers are unfit to make 
decisions about what is best for the life and well being of their fetuses.171   
The judiciary’s distrust of maternal decision-making in some circumstances and 
its willingness to enforce child abuse statutes against drug dependent mothers could 
begin to affect mothers who simply possess anti-intervention convictions. At least 
one trial court has determined that a mother’s refusal to consent to a C-section was a 
“major consideration” when terminating a mother’s parental rights.172 In that case, 
                                                                 
165 Because the government has taken a greater role in protecting the fetus, and decisions 
may have to be made in an instant, it is possible that the courts will determine that compelled 
medical treatment is acceptable. See infra Part IV.  
166The state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection to 
those unable to care for themselves.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
167Cherry, supra note 113, at 159. 
168See Wisconsin ex rel Angela M.W. v. Kruziki, 561 N.W. 2d. 729 (Wis. 1997). 
169Mothers have faced murder and child endangerment charges for using drugs while 
pregnant. See State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (convicting mother of murder after it was 
shown that mother’s use of cocaine caused fetal death); Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 
777 (1997), cert denied, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998) (charging mother with child endangerment 
after child tested positive for cocaine after birth); Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 
(Mich. Ct. App 1980) (allowing child to sue mother for taking drug during pregnancy that may 
have caused the child’s teeth discoloration); Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 
477, 488 (1980); See generally Cherry, supra note 113 (discussing the detention and 
confinement of pregnant women for the sake of fetal health); Brown, supra note 143, at 91.  
170Courts in more than thirty states have heard attempts to prosecute women for using 
drugs or alcohol during pregnancy. SHEENA MEREDITH, POLICING PREGNANCY, THE LAW AND 
ETHICS OF OBSTETRIC CONFLICT 78 (Ashgate 2005) (citing to Cynthia Cooper, Ford 
Foundation Report, Pregnant and Punished, available at http://www.fordfound.org/ 
publications).    
171Cherry, supra note 113, at 152-53.  
172 See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. V.M. and B.G., 408 N.J. Super 222, 
249 (2009) (Carchman, J. Concurring).   In affirming the trial court’s approval of the New 
Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services plan for termination of  parental rights, the per 
curium opinion declined to decide the issue of whether refusal to consent to a C-section can be 
considered an element of abuse and neglect because “substantial additional evidence of abuse 
and neglect supported the ultimate findings.” Id. at 224. 
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the mother’s combative behavior during labor (including thrashing, screaming and 
refusing to consent to a C-section or fetal scalp stimulation) resulted in an emergency 
competency evaluation.173  Following an initial conclusion that she had the capacity 
for informed consent with regard to the C-section, the mother successfully delivered 
vaginally without incident.174 Subsequent investigations into the mother’s mental 
state and her actions during those investigations resulted in termination of her 
parental rights based upon New Jersey’s child abuse and neglect statute.175 Court 
decisions like this will affect maternal decision-making.176    
D.  Limits During Labor 
Delivering a baby is dangerous.  A relatively mundane delivery can transform 
into an outright emergency in an instant.177  Add a team of nurses awaiting 
instruction, labor pains, and general excitement to an already hectic environment and 
it is easy to see why the physician needs to play an authoritative role in the delivery 
room.  Fairly or unfairly, this authority makes mothers vulnerable to coercion.178  
Because a physician has economic, legal, and personal interests in how a child is 
delivered, much of the criticism levied against the current maternity care system 
surrounds how this authority affects delivery outcomes.179 The solutions offered 
within this Note presume that such criticisms have merit.180  
                                                                 
173 Id. at 227-28.   
174 Id. at 228. 
175 Id. at 224. Although the mother’s actions after delivery may justify the court’s 
decision, her parental rights may not have been threatened had she consented to the C-section.  
See, e.g. id.at 228-34.    
176 By refusing to consent to a C-section or other procedures, mothers may be subject to 
unnecessary mental health examinations, or their refusal could weigh against their favor in a 
future parental rights dispute. Perhaps more pervasive than these hypothetical circumstances is 
the chilling effect that court decisions like V.M. will have on maternal choice; as they could 
result in maternal submission to unwanted medical treatment for fear of similar adverse 
consequences. From an alternative perspective, decisions like V.M. also provide aggressive 
advocates within the home birth movement with another opportunity to demonize mainstream 
medical care.  See infra Part IV.E. Such demonization could contribute to a hostile 
relationship between patient and physician.  
177Cf. Heyman, supra note 50.  
178See generally  BLOCK, supra  note 4, at 261; WAGNER, supra note 4, at 130-32. 
179The following section is a summation of a major criticism levied against physicians. See 
WAGNER, supra note 4; BLOCK, supra note 4, at 17, 42, 45-55; Hermer, supra note 16. The 
author does not suggest that these criticisms are completely correct or applicable to all doctors; 
however, considering the amount of attention the subject has received from the popular media 
as well as academic sources, the author believes that presenting the criticism to the reader to 
demonstrate the ways that a mother may have her choice limited is warranted.    
180 At least some evidence suggests that mothers may be pressured into having C-sections. 
See Law, supra note 6, at 354 (citing a 2006 “Listening to Mothers” survey finding that almost 
10% of women surveyed reported feeling pressured to have a C-section); BLOCK, supra  note 
4, at 17 (noting that a 2005 survey reported that one in ten women reported being pressured to 
induce).  
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1.  Pushed Births 
More than ever before, mothers are having C-sections and receiving medical 
assistance when delivering their children.181  Medical malpractice law undoubtedly 
contributes to this environment of intervention.  “Obstetricians and gynecologists 
have historically been targets of lawsuits more often than other physicians. ... [They] 
are more likely than any other kind of physician to lose a malpractice trial— and 
they pay correspondingly high insurance premiums.”182   Physicians are well aware 
of this and this knowledge may influence their chosen treatment methods.183   
Performing C-sections provides an opportunity to protect against lawsuits.184  In 
general, malpractice suits concerning C-sections focus on two types of negligence 
allegations: failure to perform a necessary C-section and negligent performance of a 
C-section.185  Choosing to perform a C-section allows a physician to avoid the 
potential liabilities that may arise from a “failure to perform a necessary C-section” 
suit186 and permits them to complete the procedure in non-emergency situation, 
which lowers the likelihood that harm will occur.187  In many circumstances, C-
sections are just as safe,188  and can be performed in a much shorter time than vaginal 
childbirth.189 C-sections, therefore, arguably allow a physician to maximize the 
efficiency and profitability of his or her practice without compromising maternal or 
fetal health.   
                                                                 
181 The C-section rate reached an all time high in 2007. See supra note 70.    The rate of 
labor induction more than doubled from 1990 to 1998, jumping to nineteen and four-tenths 
percent of all births in 1998.  Linda Villarosa, Making an Appointment With the Stork, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 2002 available at http://query.nytimes.com (archived).  Currently fifteen 
percent of deliveries in American are aided by induction methods. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 77.  
182 James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un) Reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV.  1641, 
1673 (2008) (internal citations omitted).   
183 Gibson, supra note 182, at 1674 (citing to Russell Localio et al., Relationship Between 
Malpractice Claims and Cesarean Delivery, 269 JAMA 366 (1993); Sheldon Brown III, 
Lawsuit Activity, Defensive Medicine and Small Area Variation: The Case of Cesarean 
Sections Revisited, 2 HEALTH ECON. POL’Y & L. 285 (2007)). Dr. Wagner suggests this 
conclusion as well. See WAGNER, supra note 4, at 154.  Professor Law notes that others have 
suggested that physician fears surrounding malpractice liability may be exaggerated.  Law, 
supra note 6, at 370 (citing to Margaret Lent, The Medical and Legal Risks of Electronic Fetal 
Monitoring, 51 STAN. L. REV. 897, 816-17). 
184 Gibson, supra note 182, at 1674 (documenting that a “substantial majority” of 
obstetricians respond to the legal exposure by increasing the number of cesarean deliveries 
they perform).   
185 Hilary E. Berkman, A Discussion of Medical Malpractice and Cesarean Section, 70 
ORE. L. R. 629 (1991) (identifying and discussing both malpractice claims). 
186 Id.  
187 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 41.  
188 See supra note 72.  
189 WAGNER, supra  note 4, at 38.  
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But what could be interpreted as physicians opting to provide one of two “equally 
reasonable alternatives,”190 others suggest is demonstrative of a more disturbing 
trend.191  In addition to the factors Professor Sylvia A. Law identifies as contributing 
to the high C-section rate, critics argue that doctors are allowing the desired outcome 
of a quick, cost-effective, and liability free delivery, instead of medical necessity, 
determine how laboring mothers will deliver their children.192  Too often, these 
critics allege, doctors will use their disproportionate power to “push” their patients 
into undergoing unnecessary procedures193 or taking unnecessary medication without 
giving proper respect to the mother’s wishes or her body’s natural ability to safely 
deliver a child.194    
Reducing the risk of malpractice liability is not the only reason that critics 
suggest a push may occur.  Others propose that certain personal factors also 
contribute to physicians ignoring the medical evidence and coercing mothers into 
undergoing intrusive and unnecessary procedures.195  For example, less time is 
required for a C-section, thereby freeing up more time for other activities, such as 
sleeping (nighttime delivery) or increasing income by seeing other patients.196  Dr. 
                                                                 
190 Law, supra note 6, at 362.  This Note agrees with Professor Law that “the voices of 
women should be given greater weight, particularly in circumstances such as those . . . where 
professional opinion is in conflict and women bring different values to the birthing 
experience.” Id.  
191 Professor Law concisely summarizes four factors contributing to unnecessary and 
unwanted C-sections: namely Electronic Fetal Monitoring, C-section for breech birth, failure 
to progress, and vaginal birth after C-section. See id. at 354-62. 
192 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 39-41. 
193 Perhaps the most extreme example of this “push” can be seen in the instance of vaginal 
birth after C-section (hereinafter “VBAC”). More than 9 out of 10 births after an initial C-
section are also C-sections.  Pamela Paul, The Trouble With Repeat Cesareans, TIME, Feb. 19, 
2009, available at http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,1880665,00.html (last visited Aug. 
27, 2009).  Many of these C-sections may not be the result of maternal choice, but are instead 
a consequence of physicians and hospitals refusing to attend VBAC deliveries.  Id.; Law, 
supra note 6, at 357-60, 368 (explaining that the VBAC ban in many hospitals stems from a 
“misunderstanding of the law”).  Others have documented that to protect against possible 
liability from attending such deliveries, doctors may be providing skewed information to 
mothers about the safety of VBACs. See Paul, supra note 193.  Physicians may be “pushing” 
mothers towards intervention for other reasons as well.  WAGNER, supra note 4, at 95-96. For 
example, a baby may be deemed “too big” or may remain in the uterus too long.   Id. 
194 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 39. Whatever the cause, some critics point to federal studies 
analyzing birth certificates to give merit to their claim.  Id. (citing to Ctrs. For Disease Control 
& Prevention, Nat’l Vital Stats. Reports, Births: Method of Delivery, available at 
www.cdc.goc/nchs/birth (last visited Dec. 4, 2008).  The certificates show that the percentage 
of births and emergency C-sections that happen Monday through Friday between nine and five 
is rapidly increasing relative to weekends and nighttime hours.  Id.  Wagner suggests that this 
evidence indicates that physicians are influencing the time of delivery so they will not be 
inconvenienced by having to work beyond typical working hours.  Id. at 29, 27.          
195 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 40-41. 
196 Id. at 38-41.   
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Marsden Wagner197 argues that other contributing factors include: a desire to control 
the most unpredictable portion of professional life, a belief in the trustworthiness of 
machines over a woman’s understanding of her own body, and a need to look for 
problems when none exist.198 Lastly, Dr. Wagner asserts that doctors may perform 
procedures as a means to solidify their importance within a medical community that 
is beginning to recognize the utility of delivering with a midwife.199 
Regardless of the validity of these criticisms, they will not be disappearing in the 
near future.  The factors indicating that a C-section is necessary are not based on 
objective criteria;200 instead, physicians must rely on their own judgment when 
determining whether a C-section is warranted.201  So long as the economic, legal, and 
personal motivations continue to exist, so too will the criticisms about physician 
motivations for intervening with natural labor. As these criticisms intensify in the 
mainstream media,202 and the reaction against such intervention tactics becomes 
stronger,203 the number of physician-patient conflicts may grow more frequent, and 
could produce undesirable results.  
2.  Informed Consent 
Physicians may be making improper promises or inadequate disclosures 
regarding the dangers of C-sections and inductions.204  In a recent study, less than 
one-third of the women surveyed after delivery were familiar with the risks posed by 
C-sections.205  That same study showed that less than half the women surveyed could 
correctly identify the risks of induction.206 The doctrine of informed consent explains 
that: 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has the right to 
determine what shall be done with [their] own body; and a surgeon who 
performs an operation without [their] patient's consent commits an assault, 
for which he is liable in damages . . . This is true except in cases of 
                                                                 
197 Dr. Wagner is a former director of Women’s and Children’s Health at the World Health 
Organization. Id. at viii-ix.  
198 Id. at 38-41. 
199 Id. at 39. 
200 MEREDITH, supra note 169, at 71 Cf. Paul, supra note 193.  
201 MEREDITH, supra note 169, at 71; Cf. Paul, supra note 193.  
202 See infra part IV.C.5.  
203 Cf. BLOCK, supra note 4 at 262 (documenting “informed dissent” and teaching women 
the concept of saying “no” to interventions).  
204 Cf. MEREDITH, supra note 169, at 71; WAGNER, supra note 4, at 45 (asserting that “the 
fact that women are choosing C-sections strongly suggests they are not being told the truth 
about all the risks to themselves and to their babies”); Paul, supra note 193.  
205 BLOCK, supra note 4, at 153-54.  
206 Id. at 154. 
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emergency where the patient is unconscious and where it is necessary to 
operate before consent can be obtained.207  
If women cannot identify the risks associated with a procedure, their consent may 
not be truly informed.208 
What exactly a physician must disclose varies significantly from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.209  Roughly half of the jurisdictions in America require a physician to 
provide information that a "reasonable medical practitioner" would provide in the 
same or similar circumstances.210  The remaining U.S. jurisdictions have abandoned 
this standard in favor of a "reasonable patient" standard,211 which requires the 
physician, on the basis of his medical training and experience, to objectively disclose 
what a reasonable patient expectably would deem material in making her decision.212  
In obtaining a mother’s informed consent, a physician may be able to comply with 
informed consent standards while papering over risks that may concern reasonable 
mothers.213   
Even if an individual physician does not believe that C-sections or inductions 
have a great potential for harm, the risks must still be clearly conveyed to mothers 
when making decisions.  Because "[a] compelled surgical intrusion into an 
individual's body . . . implicates expectations of privacy and security" of great 
magnitude,”214 it is paramount that a physician comply with the requirements of 
informed consent before performing a C-section. Informing a mother of these risks 
may change her feelings towards undergoing a C-section or induction.215  
There are also disagreements about the relative benefits and dangers posed by 
induced labor.  Physicians differ in their opinions regarding how dangerous Oxytocin 
is and exactly how cautious a doctor should be before administering it.216  A 
                                                                 
207 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30 (N.Y. 1914). 
208 Only seventeen percent of women who received an episiotomy reported having a 
choice in the matter. BLOCK, supra note 4, at 154.  An episiotomy is a surgical incision used to 
enlarge the vaginal opening to help deliver the baby. American Pregnancy Association, 
Episiotomy, available at http://www.americanpregnancy. org/labornbirth/episiotomy.html (last 
accessed Jan. 30 2009).   
209 Ketler, supra note 3, at 1045 (citing to Richard A. Heinemann, Note, Pushing to the 
Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor and Physician-Specific Disclosure, 1997 
WIS. L. REV. 1079, 1082(1997)). 
210Id.   
211Id. 
212See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D. C. Cir. 1972).  
213BLOCK, supra note 4, at 165, 253, 257. 
214Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2005) (citing to Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 
124 (1992)).  
215 Dr. Wagner suggests that mothers who elect to have a C-section without a medical 
reason do not have an understanding of the risks inherent in the procedure. See WAGNER, 
supra note 4, at 45. Professor Law notes that the medical profession has done a commendable 
job of attempting to reduce the appearance of coercion by requiring that doctors only discuss 
the possibility of elective C-sections after mother raises the issue. Law, supra note 6, at 367.   
216 1 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1. 
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fundamental question deals with how rapidly the starting dose should be increased 
when the patient fails to respond.217  Oxytocin has been administered under 
circumstances that later proved to be inappropriate, resulting in asphyxiation of the 
fetus, severe neurological damage to the baby, mental retardation, and a general lack 
of motor function and coordination.218  Furthermore, inducing birth does not always 
work219 and a C-section may still be required.220  
Induction also presents a unique problem that physicians may not make known to 
their patients. This threat is known as the cascade of intervention.221  Pitocin 
produces stronger and more frequent contractions.222  Once the induction process 
begins, these stronger and more frequent contractions cause pain in the increasingly 
sensitive uterus.223  Because the contractions are more painful, more anesthetics are 
required.224  As more anesthetics are required, additional medications are required to 
combat the side effects of those medications.225  A mother may not appreciate the 
pain that comes along with induced labor. If she is made aware of the possibility that 
additional medications may be needed, she may not exercise this option.   
Lastly, it has also been suggested that some courts have wrongfully assumed that 
the “elevated level of anxiety that laboring patients experience renders unnecessary 
and even harmful the usual requirements of informed consent, because in their state 
of anxiety, laboring patients are unable to make the rational choices that are a key 
reason for obtaining informed consent in the first place.”226  Dr. Suzanne K. Ketler 
further identified that some courts have subscribed to the idea that labor and birth are 
a process that happen without choice or decision, and consequently informed consent 
is not required.227   
However, informed consent law in the labor and delivery sphere continues to 
evolve.  As Dr. Ketler highlighted, Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin228 
                                                                 
217 1 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1 (citing to GABBE, supra note 78; J. Seitchik et al., 
Amniotomy and Oxytocin Treatment of Functional Dystocia and Route of Delivery, 155 AM. 
J. OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 585, 592 (1986)). 
218 1 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1 (citing Low v. United States, 795 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 
1996)); Moore v. Grandview Hospital, 495 N.E.2d 934 (Ohio 1986)). 
219 If a mother’s water breaks but her cervix fails to dilate despite receiving the drugs 
containing prostaglandins, she probably will need a c-section due to the risk of infection. 1 
Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1. 
220 WAGNER, supra note 4, 78-79.  
221 BLOCK, supra note 4, at 139.  
222 Id. 
223 Id.  Each medication carries with it its own side effect and own risks. Id. 
224 Hermer, supra note 16, at 348. 
225 BLOCK, supra note 4, at 139-40. 
226 Ketler, supra note 3, at 1045.  
227 Id. at 1040-44.  
228 588 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. 1999) (finding a breach of statutory duty to conduct second 
informed consent discussion with patient who revoked consent to vaginal delivery and 
requested C-section). 
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changed the process and timing of informed consent to a more patient centered 
approach.229  Rather than end with a physician’s specific disclosure, Dr. Ketler notes 
that Schreiber essentially requires physicians to conduct ongoing informed consent 
discussions with laboring patients whenever there is a “substantial change in 
circumstance, either medical or legal.”230  This approach is not without its 
ambiguities or shortcomings,231 but in light of the criticisms levied against the 
medical profession,232 applying this standard could curb criticisms of physician 
coercion and potentially foster a more cooperative doctor-patient relationship.233  
E.  Aggressive Advocates 
Arguments for home births and midwifery can be quite persuasive.234  In addition 
to voicing the benefits of vaginal birth with a midwife, advocates are quick to 
criticize physicians, hospitals, and the practices used within.235  Home birth 
proponents often draw a stark contrast between the soothing environment that a 
mother can create when she decides to give birth at home and the sterile, sometimes 
harsh, hospital environment.236  In espousing an aggressive, anti-physician position, 
these advocates may be guiding some mothers towards making unsafe birth choices.  
Midwife and home birth advocacy resources often cite to personal stories of 
women who, having opted for hospital births, lost control of the entire process before 
undergoing what they believed were unnecessary C-sections or other needless 
procedures.237  These advocates allege that home birth promises a more rewarding 
                                                                 
229 Ketler, supra note 3, at 1031.  
230 Id. at 1053. 
231 Id. at 1054-56. Dr. Ketler notes that this process “encroaches . . . on the physicians’ 
decision making ability and fails to provide physicians with reasonable guidelines for making 
medically necessary decisions . . . .” Id. at 1032. Moreover, Dr. Ketler criticizes the process as 
resulting in treatment on demand. Id. at 1052. Dr. Ketler proposes that statutory amendments 
be enacted to clarify when such additional discussions are needed. Id. at 1055. The author 
agrees with this recommendation and believes that such changes ought to be clearly delineated 
and then taught to mothers through the patient education process suggested by this Note. See 
infra part V. 
232 See Part III.D (outlining physician coercion). 
233 Although Dr. Ketler cautions that adopting this standard would contribute to the 
physician’s decreasing professional autonomy, a more patient centered approach could 
facilitate better communication and consequently result in more effective care.   
234 See generally WAGNER, supra note 4; BLOCK, supra note 4. There is even a national 
campaign aggressively advocating for uniform regulation and licensure for Direct-Entry 
Midwives. See The Big Push For Midwives, www.thebigpushformidwives.org (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2008). 
235 Cf. WAGNER, supra note 4, at 20-27 (criticizing the “tribal” culture of the hospital 
setting and suggesting that some doctors have a desire to harm women).   
236 Id.   
237 BLOCK, supra note 4, at 45-70.  
2010] PUSHING BACK:  PROTECTING MATERNAL AUTONOMY 73 
 
delivery experience.238  There are many health benefits to delivering vaginally.239 In 
addition to explaining those benefits, some advocates go further, encouraging home 
births because natural childbirth may increase the likelihood that a woman will 
receive a “love cocktail” of chemicals released by the body during labor.240  Such a 
chemical rush, they posit, forges a stronger, deeper bond between mother and 
child.241  
Amidst these promises of a more fulfilling delivery and encouragement for 
mothers to trust their bodies’ natural abilities to correct minor pregnancy problems, 
most midwifery proponents openly admit that the option is not safe for every 
mother.242  However, strong advocacy for the many positives of “natural” delivery 
may dilute warnings regarding the safety risks involved in childbirth and could 
potentially lull mothers or midwives into a false sense of confidence regarding the 
likelihood that a safe delivery will ensue.243 
These critics, justified or not, also lobby harsh criticisms about the utility, 
motives, and qualifications of the mainstream medical community.244  They paint 
hospitals as sterile, cold, environments, run by a “tribe” of inhuman physicians who 
are brainwashed into believing that patient choice is subordinate to convenience and 
financial well-being.245  Such characterizations are unfair and can foster a combative 
                                                                 
238 Some share stories of having orgasms while giving birth, and claim that other mothers 
can have similar experiences (not necessarily an actual orgasm, but a similar happy conclusion 
to labor). See Juju Chang and Gail Deutsch, Labor Orgasms Called ‘Best-Kept Secret,’ ABC 
NEWS, Dec. 9, 2008, available at http://i.abcnews.com/Health/Story?id=6120045&page=2 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2009),   
239 See Law, supra note 6, at 350. 
240 See THE BUSINESS OF BEING BORN, supra note 34. 
241 Id. 
242 BLOCK, supra note 4, at 95, 264; WAGNER, supra note 4, at 35, 195; Hermer, supra 
note 4, at 344. 
243 At least some parents that are selecting home births underestimate the potential risk 
involved. Wolfson, supra note 87. There are numerous reported examples of women in the 
medically high-risk category who have opted for home birth. Id. A mother’s strong desire to 
deliver outside the hospital, coupled with a trust in the body’s capability to deliver safely, 
could result in high-risk mothers delivering outside the hospital. When that confidence is 
supported by a midwife, who may attend labors that others consider “too risky” due to an error 
in judgment regarding the “screen-out” process or the consequences of the economic pressures 
inherent in maintaining a viable midwifery practice (high malpractice premiums, low-usage, 
etc.), the result could be that dangerous deliveries are attempted outside the safety of the 
hospital setting.  Cf. Dunleavy, supra note 124 (highlighting the economic difficulties of 
maintaining a viable midwife practice). Admittedly, such a choice is each mother’s to make, 
but when the decision is influenced by a demonization of mainstream medical practices, the 
perception that a hospital birth is robbing the mother of one of life’s most fulfilling 
experiences, and that such a choice could result in a weaker connection between mother and 
child, mothers may be improperly pushed towards taking an unnecessary risk.  
244 See Craig J. Thompson, Consumer Risk Perceptions in a Community of Reflexive 
Doubt, 32 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 235, 236-48.  
245 WAGNER, supra note 4, 13-36. Dr. Wagner and others openly admit that such 
generalizations do not apply to all physicians. See id. at 42;  BLOCK, supra note 4, at 264.  
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relationship between doctor and patient.246  As these criticisms become well known 
through the mainstream media247 there may be an increase in patient refusal to 
consent to physician-recommended procedures.248  
The alternative birth movement is not alone in using the media to warn against 
the dangers presented by other birth choices.  The medical community is frequently 
criticized for everything from ignoring scientific facts regarding the safety of 
midwifery & home births,249 to employing scare tactics to control doctors and 
hospitals.250 The medical lobby’s media use not only affects individual mother’s 
delivery decisions, but also plays a major role in influencing the legality of 
midwifery.251  
Taken together, the aggressive advocates on both sides of the debate have created 
an environment where determining what constitutes a safe delivery choice is a 
challenging task. The home birth movement plays upon strong emotional desires for 
a satisfying delivery outside the hospital, a sense of empowerment, and a distrust of 
physicians to create strong willed mothers who may not easily submit to necessary 
medical intervention.  On the other side of the spectrum, mothers who afford too 
much weight to the medical lobby’s distrust of out of hospital births are at risk for 
experiencing needless medical interventions because they choose to deliver in a 
hospital, rather than another available locale.252   
                                                                 
246 When emergencies require obstetrical intervention, such a relationship can jeopardize 
maternal or fetal health.  
247 See supra note 34.  
248 Cf. BLOCK, supra note 4, at 262 (documenting the “informed dissent” process, teaching 
women to say no to electronic fetal monitoring, induced labor, etc.).  Ultimately, if such 
knowledge grows more common, the result could be more court ordered medication or 
termination of parental rights. Cf. Cohen, supra note 21, at 861 (explaining the idea that there 
has begun to be a turn on the nation’s long, unquestioning deference to doctors, and noting 
that some have begun to realize that decisions that women have turned over to doctors must be 
reclaimed because they directly affect personal dignity and definitions of self).  
249 See WAGNER, supra note 4, at 45, 150-51.  
250 Id. at 27, 150.  
251 Id. at 35,118-19,124 (documenting mainstream medical associations’ actions at 
legislative hearings considering legalizing Direct-Entry Midwifery); Cohen, supra note 21, at 
854 (documenting that a standard explanation for the stalemate on midwifery reform is the 
medical lobby’s attempt to “preserve its economic share of the birthing business by preventing 
midwifery regulation and utilizing its traditional influence over courts.”).  
252 These complications demonstrate the need for an educational source that will offer 
non-biased information to expecting mothers. This Note is not alone in suggesting that 
increased maternal education is necessary to improve maternity care in America. See 
WAGNER, supra note 4, at 207-09; Donohoe, supra note 6, at 230 (“only through information 
and education will women be able to create market forces that will slow the cesarean 
epidemic”).  Part V will propose that maternal education be provided by a disinterested 
collection of midwives & physicians who can evaluate each mother’s unique risks and explain 
the benefits of each delivery option.  
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F.  Insurers Limiting Choice 
For some women, a harsh reality of childbirth is that their insurance coverage 
may limit the options they have in delivering their child. “A woman who selects a 
mode of delivery based on what she is told her insurance will reimburse is not 
exercising choice based on the best interests of her child and self.”253  Mothers who 
wish to have their delivery attended by a midwife may have trouble obtaining 
coverage for the procedure. Although the Federal Government has rewritten its 
insurance plans to allow midwives to be paid,254 some insurance companies do not 
cover home births,255 and not all state Medicaid programs reimburse Direct-Entry 
Midwives.256 Additionally, recent cost-cutting efforts have precluded some mothers 
who receive Medicaid from delivering in freestanding alternative birth centers.257 On 
the caregiver side, high malpractice insurance premiums cause physicians and 
hospitals to refuse to admit mothers with previous C-sections to attempt vaginal 
deliveries,258 discourage physicians from providing legally required backup services 
                                                                 
253Law, supra note 6, at 376.  
254 See 10 U.S.C. § 1079 (a)(13) (Amended in 1990, see P.L. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1581) 
(including midwifery as a covered medical care for the armed forces) and 42 U.S.C.A. §1396d 
(a)(17) (2009) (Amended to include “midwife” July 18, 1984, see  P.L. 98-369, 98 stat. 1110 ) 
(covering midwifery under Medicare/Medicaid); see also Harlow, supra note 21. 
255 Homebirth-USA, Cost and Insurance Coverage, www.homebirth-usa.org/choosing/ 
insurance.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
256 The American Association of Birth Centers reports that “about 9 or 10 state Medicaid 
plans pay Direct-Entry Midwives.” See American Association of Birth Centers, Medicaid and 
Birth Centers: Background Information, available at http://www.birthcenters.org/legislative-
alerts/index.php?id=17 (last visited Aug. 26, 2009); See also Midwifery Alliance of North 
America, Direct Entry Midwifery State-by-State Legal Status, supra note 11 (reflecting that 11 
states have Medicaid reimbursement). 
257 See American Association of Birth Centers, Judge Rules Against Birth Centers, 
available at http://www.birthcenters.org/news/breaking-news/?id=83. (last visited Aug. 25, 
2009) (documenting that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services is beginning to 
disallow federal matching funds to states that pay birth center facility fees).  The American 
Association of Birth Centers reports that as many as 50-95% of some birth center’s patients 
are Medicaid enrollees. Id.  
258 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 29, 178 (documenting that, in some states, malpractice 
insurance companies will no longer cover claims resulting from VBAC); Law, supra note 6 at 
356-59, 368-70 (discussing the factors that gave rise to the VBAC ban in many hospitals & 
noting that hospital and physician perceptions about risk and malpractice liability reflect a 
“misunderstanding of the law”).  See generally Paul, supra note 193 (documenting that a 2006 
survey reporting that 26% of physicians had stopped VBAC deliveries because insurance was 
unaffordable or unavailable).  Evidence suggests that some mothers are interested in 
attempting VBAC in areas where it is commonly denied. Id. (citing to a New York survey 
documenting that 57% of mothers would be interested in attempting vaginal delivery); Law, 
supra note 6, at 357 (asserting that “when VBAC is commonly denied, many women who 
would prefer vaginal birth are denied that choice”); BLOCK, supra note 4 at 261(documenting 
the plight of women who, as a result of VBAC bans, have their delivery options limited to C-
section at a hospital or homebirth with a midwife).   
76 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 23:45 
 
to freestanding alternative birth centers, and make it difficult for alternative birth 
centers and Direct-Entry Midwives to practice. 259  
IV.  “NEW” OPTIONS PROVIDE A GREATER CHANCE FOR LIMITATION 
The government, insurance companies, and health care providers may limit a 
woman’s delivery options.260  In considering these limits alongside the government’s 
growing propensity to protect the fetus, and a distrust of different birth methods, it 
appears that maternal independence during labor will begin to erode.  The following 
portion will show how elective C-sections, elective induction, and home births 
further contribute to a decline in maternal autonomy.  
A.  Home Births 
As home births grow in popularity, it is possible that more situations will arise 
where physicians call upon courts to resolve delivery room conflicts.  Pemberton261 
was examined above in detail because it is illustrative of the type of conflict that may 
arise as home births increase in popularity.  Like Ms. Pemberton, many mothers that 
opt for home births have done so because they trust their natural ability to safely 
deliver children and prefer to deliver outside of a hospital.262  These strong beliefs, 
coupled with a distrust of physicians arguably created by aggressive home birth 
advocates, could increase the number of women who do not wish to undergo any 
medical intervention during labor.  When these women call upon the hospital 
because delivery stagnates or an emergency arises, they may be more averse to 
undergoing the physician’s recommended treatment.  As more situations like this 
arise, it is possible that more of those rare circumstances will develop where doctors 
solicit the courts to compel medical treatment.   In light of the government’s growing 
propensity to protect the fetus,263 the commonly misunderstood maternal desire for 
natural delivery,264 and other commentators suggesting that compelled medical 
treatment is justifiable,265  more courts may conclude that compelled medical 
treatment is acceptable.266   
                                                                 
259 WAGNER, supra note 4 at 228-29; see also supra notes 124-25.    
260 See supra Part III.   
261 Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1247. 
262 See supra Part II.A.2. 
263See supra Part III.C. 
264 Cohen, supra note 21, at 858. 
265 See Leavy, supra note 153, at  98-99 (2005) (arguing that a state should be able to 
require a woman to under to undergo a C-section “due to the special relationship formed 
between the mother and the fetus by the time of viability”). 
266 Janet Gallagher has identified several commonalities in forced medications cases: 
medications are often initiated shortly before birth or during labor, the mothers rarely testify 
directly, and misinformation is common. See Cohen, supra note 21, at 866 n.75 (citing to Janet 
Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What’s Wrong With Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 9,  48-54 (1987)). Many of these commonalities would be present in situations 
where a mother who chooses to deliver at home seeks minor medical assistance while in the 
throes of labor.  
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The home birth movement will also affect mothers choosing to deliver in the 
hospital.  The distrust of physicians and the desire to avoid medical intervention 
cultivated by the home birth movement could cause women to distrust a physician’s 
determination that medical intervention is necessary. Such beliefs, when coupled 
with “informed dissent” programs, will lead to combative behavior in the delivery 
room that could have undesirable consequences.267  
Wherever the option is legal, regardless of safety, the choice to have a home birth 
attended by a midwife is a choice every mother can make.268  So long as the option 
remains available, interested parties’ concerns that home births needlessly risk fetal 
health269 will always be present.  Accordingly, steps should be taken to protect a 
mother’s choice to deliver where she sees fit, without fear of judicial intervention or 
the adverse consequences of her decision.  This Note proposes such steps in Part V.  
B.  C-Sections & Induced Labor 
Elective C-sections and scheduled inductions will adversely affect the 
independence of mothers hoping to avoid medical intervention.270  It has been 
asserted that patient-choice C-sections lower or entirely remove the threshold for 
when a C-section becomes medically necessary.271  Because of this lower threshold, 
doctors may begin to determine that the criteria indicating that intervention is 
appropriate exist sooner in the delivery process, thereby making mothers more likely 
to experience a C-section or induction.272  Also, it is possible that a doctor’s views 
about the acceptability of such procedures will be altered by the increasing number 
of mothers requesting these procedures.273  The effects of this lower threshold could 
be further exacerbated by the economic, legal, and personal benefits that physicians 
receive when they opt to perform a C-section.274   
                                                                 
267 This could result in termination of parental rights. See supra notes 172-176 and 
accompanying text.  Even if a mother does not aggressively resist certain treatment methods, 
the chilling effect from previous court decisions may cause her to consent to procedures she 
does not desire out of fear that combative behavior may result in undesirable consequences. 
See supra note 176. 
268See, e.g., supra Part III (explaining that a mother’s right to choose her delivery option is 
a fundamental right protected by the Constitution).  
269See supra Part II.  Fetal injuries can occur in the home birth setting because it places 
distance between mothers, skilled obstetricians, and valuable hospital equipment. Also 
because there is no absolute method that can readily predict if or when a seemingly low-risk 
pregnancy will turn into a high-risk one, determining that a mother is “low-risk” does not 
guarantee that the mother will not need skilled medical assistance. Rausch, supra note 11, at 
229. 
270 Professor Law shares this concern.  See Law, supra note 6, at 380 (suggesting that 
elective C-sections may lead to diminished maternal choice. “It would be tragic if respect for 
those choices led to an increase in the number of women pressured to have C-sections.”) 
271 BLOCK, supra note 4, at 125 (quoting Howard Minkoff, Chair of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology at Maimonidies Medical Center, Brooklyn, NY).  
272 See Law, supra note 6, at 380 
273 Id.  
274 See supra Part III.D.  
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V.  RESOLUTION 
No delivery method can guarantee a safe and healthy baby. In most births, these 
“new” delivery options are safe choices that a mother can justifiably exercise.275  
However, economic, legal, ideological, personal, and professional interests influence 
a mother’s choice.  As more women deliver using “new” options, it seems possible 
that these interests will unfairly influence delivery decisions.  
Numerous scholars have concluded that the mother is the best person to decide 
how to deliver her child,276 and legal and medical standards are often in accord with 
this position.  But making the appropriate decision in light of numerous influences 
and limitations can be challenging.  A culture of physician distrust and uncertainty 
about the safety of home births leaves some mothers without desirable options. For 
some, the choice boils down to delivering in the hospital and risking unnecessary 
intervention or injury, or delivering outside the hospital277 and risking injury because 
skilled physicians and instruments are not readily available. Consequently, some 
mothers are forced into choices that could result in physical and emotional injuries.278  
And while the circumstances underlying these problems cannot be totally eliminated, 
the state can take several steps to ensure that delivery decisions are well-informed, 
made free from coercion, and without fear of negative repercussions. 
A.  Empowering the Mother as A Decision Maker 
1.  Increase the Information Available 
The first way to protect mothers against the adverse effects of these “new” 
delivery options is to increase the information made available to mothers.279 As 
discussed above, only two states currently require that hospitals disclose their C-
section and induction rates.280 In the past, concerted efforts to enact similar 
legislation in other states have been stymied by powerful medical lobbies.281  
Margaret Donohoe has suggested that information be physician specific, as a means 
to curb unnecessary C-sections.282  Ms. Donohoe posits that making this information 
available would help create market forces that could influence hospitals away from 
C-section overuse and help women understand that C-sections are not always 
necessary or appropriate.283  In furthering Ms. Donohoe’s suggestion, caregiver-
                                                                 
275 Law, supra note 6, at 346. 
276 See generally Cohen, supra note 21, at 854 (arguing that, given the mother’s strong 
privacy interests and parental rights to the developing child, the mother-to-be is the best 
childbirth decision maker); Harris, supra note 86;  Law supra note 6, at 362; WAGNER, supra 
note 4, at 205-07.   
277 BLOCK, supra note 4, at 261. 
278 Injuries could occur in either the delivery or the home birth setting.  
279 Donohoe, supra note 6, at 237; WAGNER, supra note 4, at 205-09.  
280 See supra note 132. 
281 Donohoe, supra note 6, at 238; WAGNER, supra note 4, at 11. 
282 Donohoe, supra note 6, at 238-39.  
283 Id. at 237.   
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specific information should also be made available for Certified Professional and 
Direct Entry Midwives.284  Having this information available on a midwife-specific 
level would result in a better public understanding of the safety of out-of-hospital 
midwife delivery, both for individuals considering delivery with a midwife and for 
legislators looking for evidence regarding midwife safety.  A better understanding of 
midwife safety could result in fewer women being subject to unnecessary in-hospital 
procedures.  At the same time, making safety information available to the public 
might deter midwives from attending risky deliveries that should take place in the 
hospital. 
Additional beneficial information could also become available by documenting 
the number of “pushed births” at a given hospital. In 2005, Florida approved a 
constitutional amendment giving patients access to records related to “adverse 
medical incidents.”285 This amendment “represents one of the most sweeping 
changes in law and public policy ever adopted in [Florida].”286  Amendment 7’s 
purpose is to “create a constitutional right for a patient or a potential patient to know 
and have access to records of a health care facility’s or provider’s adverse medical 
incidents, including medical malpractice and other acts which have caused or have 
the potential to cause injury or death.”287 A Florida court has defined “adverse 
medical incidents” to mean “medical negligence, intentional misconduct and any 
other act, neglect, or default of a health care facility that caused or could have caused 
injury or death to a patient . . . .”288  It could be argued that compelling mothers to 
undergo unnecessary procedures constitutes an adverse medical incident worthy of 
documentation.289  By attempting to document the number of “pushed births,” 
mothers angered with the way their delivery was managed would have a formal 
avenue to voice their discontent, the public would have a way to investigate the 
coercive nature of physicians, and physicians would be further dissuaded from 
coercing mothers into undergoing unnecessary interventions. 
2.  Encouraging Disinterested Involvement 
It is well settled that the government “has an interest in protecting the integrity 
and ethics of the medical profession.”290  If the criticisms about physicians pushing 
patients into invasive procedures or misleading mothers about their choices are 
                                                                 
284 Hospital transfer rates, documentation of adverse medical outcomes, etc. 
285 FL. CONST. art. X § 25. 
286 J.B. Harris, Riding the Red Rocket: Amendment 7 and the End to Discovery Immunity 
of Adverse Medical Incidents in the State of Florida, 80 FLA. BAR. J. 20 (2009). 
287 Id. at ¶ 6 (citing to Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re: Patient’s Right to 
Know About Adverse Medical Incidents, 880 So.2d 617, 619 (Fla. 2004)). 
288 Id. at ¶ 10 (citing to Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 932 So. 2d 344, 350 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Cr. App 2006)). 
289 Accusations would first have to be reviewed for merit.  
290 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997); see also Barsky v. Board of 
Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 347 U.S. 442, 451, (1954) (indicating that the State has a 
"legitimate concern for maintaining high standards of professional conduct in the practice of 
medicine”).  
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valid,291 then some health care providers have brought the medical profession’s 
integrity into question.292   To restore and protect this integrity, a state-supported, 
disinterested maternal education program should be developed to encourage 
disinterested physicians and midwives to cooperatively educate individual mothers 
about the particular risks and benefits of their available delivery options and rights.  
By requiring mothers early in pregnancy to consult with a state supported physician-
midwife panel that is not ultimately responsible for her care, the state could negate 
the effects of aggressive birth advocates, eliminate concerns that physicians are 
providing mothers with inadequate or improper information, and expose mothers 
who had never considered delivery with a midwife an opportunity to interact with a 
caregiver who applies a different philosophical approach to childbirth.  Additionally, 
more education may result in greater maternal independence in the delivery room, 
because mothers may be able to communicate better with their physicians, and 
physicians may have a greater respect for the mother’s delivery choice.  Likewise, 
home births will be safer because mothers will better appreciate the risks of 
delivering outside the hospital, and will have more knowledge to draw upon that will 
enable them to recognize and appreciate signs of trouble.293  
B.  Incentivize More Appealing Birth Conditions   
A second way to protect mothers against the adverse effects of these “new” 
delivery options is to offer economic incentives to make all labor options more 
appealing.    Freestanding alternative birth centers offer some mothers the freedom 
they desire,294 but are not available everywhere.295 Where they are, high malpractice 
premiums and changes to Medicaid are making it difficult for poorer mothers to 
exercise the option.296  Currently, bills to amend Title XIX of the Social Security Act 
to require coverage for freestanding alternative birth centers under the Medicaid 
program are before both the United States Senate and House of Representatives.297  
Passing this legislation would make freestanding alternative birth centers more 
accessible to mothers with strong anti-intervention beliefs, but who cannot afford the 
option without governmental aid.  Furthermore, additional economic incentives 
should be directed towards subsidizing the high malpractice premiums that 
                                                                 
291 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. 
292 The medical community has made commendable strides to ensure that coercion does 
not occur. See Law, supra note 6, at 367. Nevertheless, criticisms of physician coercion 
persist. Cf. Paul, supra note 193. By having disinterested, qualified physicians & midwives 
cooperatively educate mothers, criticisms regarding coercion would be greatly reduced. 
293 The midwife approach requires the mother to take more responsibility for her own care 
and education.  Hermer, supra note 16.  This Note does not contend that mothers are currently 
uneducated, but instead suggests that hands on education with a trained obstetrician and 
midwife during pregnancy will only further benefit the mother. 
294 WAGNER, supra note 4, at 133, 137. 
295 See, e.g., BLOCK, supra note 4, at 106, 267.  
296 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.  
297 Medicaid Birth Center Reimbursement Act, H.R. 2358, 111th Cong. (2009); Medicaid 
Birth Center Reimbursement Act, S. 1423, 111th Cong. (2009).   
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physicians must pay when they allow mothers to attempt to deliver vaginally after a 
C-section or when they provide backup services to a freestanding alternative birth 
center.298   
C.  Rethinking Informed Consent 
A final way to protect mothers against the potential adverse effects of these 
“new” birth options involves adopting a reshaped perception of informed consent in 
the childbirth arena.  Adopting the conception of informed consent articulated in 
Schreiber299 will foster a more cooperative physician-patient relationship.  Such a 
continual, dialogue-driven informed consent process is consistent with the overall 
progression towards greater maternal autonomy throughout pregnancy,300 and 
Professor Law’s conclusion that women’s voices be given greater weight in birthing 
decisions.301  This approach, when coupled with the education proposed within this 
Note,302 can help eliminate coercive physician treatment, facilitate maternal trust in 
physician decision-making, and aid in restoring the integrity of the medical 
profession.    
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As mothers are given more freedom to make their delivery choices, problems with 
the current maternity care system and the legal protections afforded fetus have the 
potential to diminish maternal independence.  At one end of the spectrum, the home 
birth movement and reactions against “medicalized” birth have the potential to create 
physician distrust and a greater resistance to medical treatment.  This resistance, 
when coupled with an expansive view of fetal rights may result in compelled medical 
treatment, injury, or the loss of parental rights.  At the other end of the spectrum, 
elective C-sections and inductions will diminish the likelihood that mothers who 
wish to avoid medical intervention will be able to do so.303  Somewhere in between, 
the fears surrounding birth are precluding mothers from exercising viable options 
from the living room to the delivery room. A three-part solution has been proposed 
to alleviate these problems.  Taken together, these three prongs will empower 
women to make better-informed birth decisions, hold physicians and midwives more 
accountable, and create a more cooperative relationship between physician and 
patient.  
                                                                 
298 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.  
299 Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 26. 
300 See Ketler, supra, note 3.  
301 Law, supra note 6, at 362 
302 The state can teach patients precisely what situations trigger the legal or medical 
change in circumstances that necessitate further informed consent when it educates mothers 
through the solution proposed herein. 
303 This Note agrees with Professor Law in reaching this conclusion.  
